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THE INTERIM PROVISIONS OF THE SPEEDY
TRIAL ACT: AN INVITATION TO FLEE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act)' was passed by Congress to effectuate2
the sixth amendment right of federal criminal defendants to a speedy trial
and to "assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism." '3 The Act
mandates the commencement of trial of federal criminal defendants within a4
maximum of one hundred days of the date of arrest or service of summons,
and seeks to accomplish this goal by setting out time limits within which
indictments must be filed, s arraignments must be held, 6 and trials must
7
commence.
Despite the years of work leading up to the passage of the Act,8 it is
inartfully drawn. Portions of its text are ambiguous, giving rise to conflicting
interpretations. 9 A conflict in the circuits has already arisen over the proper
interpretation to be given to the "interim limits" section. The Ninth Circuit,
utilizing a plain-meaning approach to its construction of the section, has
reached a result which is questionable.10 The District of Columbia Circuit has
reached a contrary result after examining the legislative history of the Act. I
This Note will focus on the current state of the controversy over the
interpretation of the "interim limits" section of the Act. It will propose an
1.
2.

Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. V 1975)).
The sixth amendment provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. VI.

3. Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076. The Act was passed by Congress under the power
conferred by the necessary and proper clause as well as under its article III power to enact
legislation implementing the speedy trial requirement of the sixth amendment. S. Rep. No. 1021,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974) (hereinafter cited as S. Rep.]. Congress noted a 1970 National
Bureau of Standards study which showed an 11% recidivism, or rearrest, rate for defendants
released while awaiting trial. H. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 7401, 7409 [hereinafter cited as 11. Rep.]; see S. Rep., supra at 7. The
study also showed an increased propensity to be rearrested after release of more than 280 days
and an increased propensity of persons classified as dangerous to be rearrested in the 8- to
24-week period before trial. H. Rep., supra at 7409. See 6 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev.
No. 2 (1971) for more on the National Bureau of Standards Study.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (Supp. V 1975). This figure is arrived at by adding up the time limits
set out in § 3161(b), (c).
S. Id. § 3161(b).
6. Id. § 3161(c).
7. Id.
8. Speedy trial legislation had been introduced regularly since the 88th Congress. S. Rep.,
supra note 3, at 3. The Act represents over three years of work by the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights. Id.
9. See generally Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667, 676-722 (1976).
One court has found the Act unconstitutional as a "legislative encroachment on the judiciary."
(Judge Joseph H. Young, D.C. Md.). N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1977, at 10, col. 3.
10. United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976).
11. United States v. Corley, 548 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

INTERIM PROVISIONS
appropriate resolution of the controversy through a consideration of general
rules of statutory construction and through an examination of the legislative
history of the Act. It will also consider whether judicial council approval of
district court speedy trial plans might have an effect on the judicial resolution
of the issue in the circuits.

II.

THE AcT

The basic provisions of the Act are set out in section 3161 which establishes
time limits for the filing of informations or indictments and for holding
arraignments and trials. 12 The Act requires an information or indictment
charging an individual with a federal offense to be filed not more than thirty
days after he has been arrested or served with a summons.' 3 Arraignment
must be held within ten days of the filing date,' 4 and trial must be held within
sixty days of the arraignment.' s
In recognition of the strain which the immediate imposition of these time
limits would place upon the judicial system, Congress provided for a transitional period during which longer deadlines are initially imposed. 16 The
transitional period deadlines are gradually shortened until the one hundredday limit, embodied in section 3161, takes effect on July 1, 1979.t7 After that
date, the primary sanction of dismissal of the complaint, information, or
indictment will be imposed for failure to meet applicable deadlines.' 8
To provide for some flexibility, and to ensure that "the time limits do not
fall too harshly upon either the defendant or the Government,"' 9 the Act
provides in section-31651(h) for the exclusion of certain periods of delay in
computing the time to trial. 20 Excludable time includes delay resulting from
hearings on pretrial motions, examinations and hearings on the mental
competency or physical incapacity of the defendant, interlocutory appeals,
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (Supp. V 1975).
13. Id. § 3161(b).
14. Id. § 3161(c).
15. Id.
16. Id. §§ 3161(0, (g), 3163(a), (b).
17. Id. The effect of the transitional period is that until July 1, 1976, no time limits are
imposed. From July 1, 1976, to July 1, 1977, the maximum allowable time between arrest or
service of summons and trial is 250 days. From July 1, 1977, to July 1, 1978, the maximum
allowable time is 175 days, and from July 1, 1978, to July 1, 1979, it is 125 days. Finally, on July
1, 1979, the § 3161 time limits take effect and the maximum allowable time between arrest or
service of summons and trial will be 100 days. Id.
18. Id. §§ 3162, 3163(c). The court may also discipline counsel for the defendant or the
attorney for the Government for knowingly allowing the case to be set for trial without disclosing
that a necessary witness will be unavailable, filing a motion which he knows is totally frivolous
and without merit solely for the purpose of delay, making a statement which he knows to be false
and which is material to the granting of a continuance for the purpose of obtaining a continuance,
or otherwise willfully failing to proceed to trial without justification. Id. § 3162(b).
19. S. Rep., supra note 3, at 35; see H. Rep., supra note 3, at 7415.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (Supp. V 1975).
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and absence or unavailability of the defendant or an
transfer proceedings,
21
essential witness.
In section 3164 of the Act, Congress designated two classes of defendants
whose cases are to receive priority during the transitional period. 2 2 Detained
persons who are being held solely because they are awaiting trial and released
persons awaiting trial who have been designated "high-risk" 23 by the attorney
for the Government must come to trial no later than ninety days following the
beginning of continuous detention or designation of high risk. 24 Failure to
commence trial of a detained defendant within this ninety-day limit, through
no fault of the accused or his counsel, will result in the release of the
defendant. 25

III.

THE CONTROVERSY AND THE JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS

It is the applicability of section 3161(h)'s excludable periods of delay to the
ninety-day interim limit applicable to detained defendants and high-risk
releasees during the transitional period which is the source of the controversy
in the circuits. If the delay exclusions do apply to the interim limit, they will
toll the running of the ninety-day period. If they do not apply, a strict
ninety-day limit will be enforced, after which detainees awaiting trial must be
released. This last interpretation could have serious consequences since it
could lead to the early release of dangerous felons who might then leave the
jurisdiction of the court.
A. The Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Tirasso,26 two foreign nationals were indicted on
charges of conspiracy stemming from an alleged attempt to smuggle cocaine.
21.

Id.

22.

Id.

§ 3164(a).

23. A "high-risk" defendant was defined by the Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States as "(1) one whose chances of
appearing at his trial or other court proceedings have been judicially determined to be poor; or (2)
one reasonably designated by the United States Attorney as posing a danger to himself or any other
person or to the community." Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Model Statement of Time Limits and Procedures for
Achieving Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, quoted in Appellant's Memorandum of Law
and Fact at Appendix A, United States v. Corley, 548 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976). As a practical
matter, few courts actually use designations of "high-risk " Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Report on the Implementation of Title I and Title II of the Speedy Trial Act of
1974, at 18 (Sept. 30, 1976).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) (Supp. V 1975).
25. Id. § 3164(c).
26. 532 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976). The first case to touch upon the relationship between §§ 3164
and 3161(h) was Moore v. United States Dist. Court, 525 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1975). In Moore the
defendant petitioned for a writ of mandamus to set aside certain pretrial proceedings, including her
arraignment. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court was faced with a problem of statutory
time limits under § 3164. The court denied the petition and held that, in computing the ninety-day
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They had been arrested on November 19, 1975, but the trial was delayed
until April 13, 1976, because of a lengthy government investigation. 2 7 Defendants, confined since their arrest, moved in the district court for release from
custody. The motion was denied. 28 On appeal, they argued that the wording
of section 3164 of the Act unconditionally mandated their release, even
though the pretrial delay was caused by a lengthy government investigation
and there was a high probability that they
would flee to a foreign country if
30
released. 29 The Ninth Circuit agreed.
The Tirasso court first looked to the language of the statute, found section
3164 straightforward and unambiguous, and concluded that, under the clear
wording of the statute, defendants continuously detained for more than ninety
days solely because they are awaiting trial must be released. 3 1 The court next
looked to the House report 32 and, citing a portion which, in effect, paraphrased the language of 3164, found that the legislative history of the Act
supported its interpretation. 33 The court noted that the Act explicitly provides
that section 3161(h)'s exclusions are applicable to the permanent and transitional periods, but that it is silent in this regard with respect to the interim
Emit, a district court has discretion to exclude periods of time during which a defendant is undergoing
study of his mental competency pursuant to a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 and during which
hearings on the issue of competency are being held. Id. at 329. The court reasoned that during such
periods a person is not a defendant detained "solely because he is awaiting trial ...
." Id.
The Moore court based its decision on the language of § 3164(a)(1) and ignored the fact that the
delay caused by examination and hearings on the defendant's competency was one of the categories of
excludable delay under § 3161(h). Since the court could have decided the case by holding that the
provisions of § 3161(h) are incorporated into § 3164, its failure to do so raised the inference that the
Ninth Circuitdid notconsider the exclusions applicable to §3164. Such an inference was drawn from
theMoore decision by the Eastern Districtof California in United States v. Soliah, Crim. No. 75-523
(E.D. Cal. January 14, 1976). In that case the Government moved for a thirty-day continuance
because of the unavailability, due to pregnancy, of one of its witnesses. In reaching its finding that the
continuance could not be granted without releasing the defendant, the court relied upon foore and
found that, by implication, the Ninth Circuit had rejected the contention that § 3161(h) exclusions
apply to § 3164. Id.; accord, United States v. Bigelow, 544 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1976).
27. 532 F.2d at 1299.
28. Id.
29. The court noted that arrest of the defendants prior to the conclusion of the Government's
investigation was necessary because the defendants were foreign nationals, only recently arrived
from abroad, who were likely to flee the country at any time. Id.
30. Id. at 1299. The result in Tirasso was reached although the court questioned the wisdom of
the statute and despite the court's recognition of the dangers inherent in its decision. The court noted
that there was virtually no way to ensure the defendants' appearance for trial, and defense counsel
had all but admitted that, if the defendants were released, their appearance could not be counted on.
Id. at 1300.
31. Id. at 1299-1300.
32. Id. at 1300. Although the opinion quotes a segment from the congressional reports and
attributes it to the Senate report, the quoted segment actually appears in the House report.
33. Id. The report states: "Failure to commence the trial of a detained person under this
section [§ 3164] results in the automatic review of the terms of release by the court and, in the
case of a person already under detention, release from custody." H. Rep., supra note 3, at 7416.
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period. 34 Although acknowledging in a footnote that the difference might be
the result of a drafting error or a misunderstanding of the requirements of
criminal administration,3 5 the court determined that the Act's silence with
respect to the relationship between sections 3161(h) and 3164 required it "to
find that the clearly expressed congressional intent is to provide no periods of
exclusion for the ninety-day trial requirement applicable during the interim
period. '36 Although the court questioned the wisdom 37 of the statute, it
believed itself constrained to enforce its plain terms, noting: "It is discouraging that our highly refined and complex system of criminal justice is suddenly
faced with implementing a statute that is so inartfully drawn
as this one. But
'38
this is the law, and we are bound to give it effect.
B.

The District of Columbia Circuit

In United States v. Corley39 the District of Columbia Circuit expressly
declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in Tirasso.40 In Corley, the
defendant was arrested on September 8, 1976, but delay in filing pretrial
motions and illness of the trial judge resulted in a continuance of the trial to
January 17, 1977.41 Defendant moved for release from custody pursuant to
section 3164. The district court denied defendant's motion and held that
section 3161(h) delay should be excluded in computing section 3164's ninetyday limit to trial. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, 42 relying on the
reasoning of two earlier district court decisions, United States v. Masko43 and
44
United States v. Mejias.
In Masko45 the Western District of Wisconsin rejected the Tirasso court's
34.

532 F.2d at 1299-1300.

35. Id. at 1300 n.1.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1300.
38. Id. at 1301. Tirasso was relied on by the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado in United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1976). In that case the
defendant had been arrested in Paris on February 4, 1976, but, because France insisted on long
extradition proceedings, the defendant was not returned to the United States until May 10, 1976,
The defendant moved for release from custody, claiming that § 3164 of the Act mandated her
release. Although admitting that the result was illogical, the district court followed Tirasso and
held that the clear language of the Act supported defendant's claim. Id. at 1127.
39. 548 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
40. Id. at 1044.
41. Id. at 1043-44.
42. Id. at 1044.
43. 415 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
44. 417 F. Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Martinez,
538 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. In Masko a warrant for the arrest of two defendants (Cutting and Masko) was issued on
February 6, 1976, on the basis of a complaint charging them with the armed robbery of a bank.
On February 20, 1976, a single-count indictment was returned against both defendants, and
Cutting, in custody since February 11, 1976, was released on bail. Trial was set for June 14,
1976. Masko was not apprehended until April 27, 1976, and because he was not able to make
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'4 6
reasoning and, instead, chose to consider the "grand scheme of the Act.
The court noted that section 3164 limits would expire on July 1, 1979, when
the permanent provisions of the Act would take effect, and it thus found that
the purpose of section 3164's ninety-day limit was to ensure that, during the
transitional period, continuous detention of defendants awaiting trial would
end at some time before the longer transitional time limits ran. 47 The court
found nothing to indicate that Congress intended to deal with the problem of
pretrial detention more strictly during the transitional period than after the
Act's permanent time limits became effective. In sharp contrast to the literal
approach of Tirasso, the Masko court stated that it was "bound to choose a
reasonable statutory construction rather than an unreasonable
construction
48
when the choice [was] open to [it], as it [was] here.1
In United States v. Mejias4 9 the Southern District of New York also

bail, he remained in custody pending trial. On lay 27, 1976, a six-count indictment was returned
against the defendants. On June 1, 1976, the attorney for the Government told the court that the
sixth count was intended to supersede the February 20, 1976, indictment and requested a delay of
trial because the charges in the May 27, 1976, indictment were more complex. Trial was set for
July 16, 1976. Cutting moved for a change in the trial date to any date after August 18, 1976,
because his attorney was otherwise engaged.
On June 4, 1976, the court, on its own motion, directed the parties to show cause: 1) why the
court should delay the trial by granting a continuance, and 2) why the court should not exclude
from its calculation of § 3164's ninety-day limit, with respect to Masko, any delay defined in §
3161(h). The court noted that its approved "plan for prompt disposition of criminal cases,"
adopted pursuant to the Act and scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 1976, provided for the
application of § 3161(h) exclusions to cases involving defendants detained solely because they
were awaiting trial. 415 F. Supp. at 1319-20.
46. Id. at 1321.
47. Id. at 1322. During the second year of the transitional period a case must come to trial
within 250 days plus excludable time defined in § 3161(h). See note 17 supra and text
accompanying notes 16-17. The court's interpretation would mean that a case involving a
detained defendant must come to trial within 90 days plus excludable time, or a total of 160 days
earlier than a case in which a defendant is not detained.
48. 415 F. Supp. at 1323.
49. 417 F. Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.), a'd on othergrounds sub nom. United States v. Martinez,
538 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1976). In Mejias a group of defendants, indicted and arrested on February
19, 1976, remained in custody pending trial. Although rule 8(B) of the Southern District Rules
required that motions be made within ten days of pleading, the defendants made no motions
within that time. On application of the defendants, the trial court extended the time to file
motions to April 1, 1976, and hearings on pretrial motions commenced May 17, 1976. On May
20, 1976, the ninety-first day of continuous detention, the defendants moved for release from
custody for failure to provide a ninety-day trial pursuant to § 3164 of the Act and rule 6 of
the Rules of the Southern District's Plan for Achieving Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases
(Interim Plan). The court noted that rule 6 (Excluded Periods) of the Interim Plan was expressly
applicable to rule 5 (All Cases: Trial Readiness and Effect of Non-Compliance), but that it was
silent as to its relationship to rule 3 (Time Requirements for Trial of Defendants in Custody and
of High Risk Defendants). Although this might have been construed as a bar to any exclusions
under rule 3, an inference buttressed by a reading of the Southern District's proposed Plan for
Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases (Proposed Plan) scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 1976,
(if approved), the court rejected this interpretation. Since the Proposed Plan was not yet
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rejected the reasoning of Tirasso and read the Act in such a way as to render
it a "sensible and workable whole." 50 The court noted:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these
words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In
such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to
absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the
purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the
policy of the legislation as a whole" this Court has followed that purpose, rather than
the literal words. 5'
Thus the Mejias court looked to the legislative history of the Act and
concluded that Congress intended the section 3161(h) delay exclusions to
apply to the section 3164 interim limits. The court noted that the Senate
report explicitly stated that the Act's interim plans would be similar to the
Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. 52
Since, where a defendant was detained, the Second Circuit rules required the
Government to be ready for trial within ninety days, and allowed a number of
exclusions in computing this time limit, the court concluded that Congress
intended section 3161(h) delay exclusions to be applied in computing section
3164's ninety-day limit.5 3 Additionally, the court found it doubtful that
Congress had provided a speedier trial for detained and high-risk defendants
operative, and since the Interim Plan did not compel the conclusion that hearing time on pretrial
motions could not be excluded, the court gave the Interim Plan a reading consistent with its
understanding of the Act. The court conceded that the group responsible for formulating the
Proposed Plan intended not to exclude time devoted to pretrial hearings. However, it was not
convinced that the Board of Judges was fully aware of the implications of the Proposed Plan. Id.
at 579-85. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the plan, as adopted, expressly makes § 3161(h)
exclusions applicable to defendants in custody and high-rik defendants. See Southern District's
Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, published in McKinney's Consolidated Laws of
New York Annotated, 1976 New York Court Rules, Plan for Achieving Prompt Disposition of
Criminal Cases.
50. 417 F.Supp. at 583.
51. Id. (quoting United States v.American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)).
52. Id. at 582. The Second Circuit plan referred to was the Second Circuit Rules Regarding
Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. U.S. Ct. of App. 2d Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt
Disposition of Criminal Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. appendix (West Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as 2d
Circuit Rules]. This plan was superseded by plans adopted pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act.
53. 417 F. Supp. at 582. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed on other grounds. United States
v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1976). The court noted that § 3164(c) of the Act provides that
failure to commence trial within ninety days "through no fault of the accused or his counsel" shall
result in release of the accused. Id. at 923-24 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c) (Supp. V 1975)). The court
also noted that the defendants had failed to file timely motions. Thus it held that the delay was
directly attributable to the "fault of the accused or his counsel" and that, under such circumstances, the trial court's denial of the defendants' motions for release was proper. Id. at 924. The
Second Circuit specifically stated that it was not holding, as had the trial court, that § 3161(h)
exclusions apply to § 3164. Although the circuit court found the reasoning of the trial court
"persuasive," it was not necessary to decide this issue on the facts of the case. Id.
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under the interim provisions of the Act than those defendantsS would be
entitled to when the permanent provisions took effect in 1979. 4
IV.

EVALUATION

A. Approaches to Statutory Construction
Examination of the foregoing cases clearly discloses that the issue on which
the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits are split is one of statutory
construction-whether courts are bound by a "plain meaning" interpretation
of the interim limits provisions of the Act, or whether they may adopt a
"reasonable statutory construction" in light of available evidence of congressional intent. The Ninth Circuit, in using a plain meaning approach,
inferred congressional intent primarily from the wording of the Act. In so
doing, the court placed itself in the awkward position of arguing that
Congress intended an unwise result. s The District of Columbia Circuit
recognized the importance of legislative history in determining legislative
purpose. That court's approach is more satisfying because the court attempted
to give effect to the "purpose, rather than the literal words" S6 of the statute.
The Supreme Court stated the plain meaning doctrine in its traditional
strict form in Caminetti v. United States.5 7 In deciding whether the Mann
Act,5 8 which forbids taking a woman across state lines for prostitution,
debauchery, or other immoral purposes, applied to private, noncommercial
vice, the Court said:
[W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the
legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations
drawn from titles or designating names or reports accompanying their introduction, or
from any extraneous source. In other words, the language being plain, and not leading
to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate
legislative intent.s9

Even under this statement of the doctrine, arguments can be made that the
54.

417 F. Supp. at 582.

55.

532 F.2d at 1300.

56. 417 F. Supp. at 583 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940)). See the text accompanying note 51 supra for the full text of the quoted material. This
approach to problems of statutory construction is not new for the District of Columbia Circuit. That
court has, on many occasions, recognized its duty to elucidate and effectuate congressional intent,
even at the expense of plain meaning. Thus, in District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 9S7 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), the court noted that "the 'plain meaning' doctrine has always been subservient to a truly
discernible legislative purpose however discerned, by equitable construction or recourse to legislative
history." Id. at 959; see Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), ccr.
denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
57. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2724 (1970).

59. 242 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). In Caminetti, the Court declined to consider the Act's
legislative history, even though that history clearly indicated that the evil Congress sought to curtail
was the "white slave trade" and not noncommercial vice.
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Ninth Circuit erred in failing to consider the legislative history of the Act.
First, it can be argued that section 3164 should not be viewed in isolation, but
rather that its meaning must be considered in the context of the Act as a
whole. 60 Thus, although the language of section 3164 alone may be "plain,"
that section's relationship to the transitional period time limits, in general,
and to the excludable delay provisions, in particular, is ambiguous. A legitimate
question arises whether Congress did, in fact, intend to provide for a speedier
trial for detained and high-risk defendants under the interim provisions than
those defendants would be entitled to under the permanent provisions of the
Act. Under such circumstances, where the words of a statute are not "free
from doubt," consideration of legislative history is proper. 61
Alternatively, it can be argued that a literal interpretation of section 3164
leads to a result that is not only unwise, as Tirasso admitted, 62 but that is also
"absurd or wholly impracticable. '63 This argument is compelling in circumstances similar to those in Tirasso where release of the defendant almost
certainly would result in his flight from the jurisdiction. When application of
the plain meaning doctrine would lead to absurd results, resort to legislative
64
history is proper.
Moreover, in recent years the Supreme Court has referred to legislative
material in construing statutes even when the plain meaning was not ambiguous or absurd. 65 The importance of legislative history was emphatically stated
by the Court in United States v. American Trucking Associations.6 6 There the
Court was called upon to determine the meaning of the term "employee" as
that term was used in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,67 which sought to
regulate qualifications and maximum hours of motor carrier employees. The
Court noted that the legislative history of the section in which the term
appeared, as well as an analysis of other provisions of the Act, clearly
revealed that the legislative purpose was to ensure safety of service. In
confining the term "employee" to those whose duties affected safety of
operation, the Court said: "When aid to construction of the meaning of words,
as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law'
which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial

examination.'

"68

Since the Supreme Court's assertion in American Trucking, the Court has
repeatedly looked to legislative history for support of its statutory interpretations, even while acknowledging that resort to the history may not be
60. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
61. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
62. 532 F.2d at 1300; see text accompanying note 37 supra.
63. 242 U.S. at 490. See text accompanying note 59 supra for the full text of quoted material.
64. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
65. See generally Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule" and Statutory
Interpretationin the "Modern" FederalCourts, 75 Colum L. Rev. 1299 (1975) (hereinafter cited as
Murphy].
66. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
67. 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
68. 310 U.S. at 543-44 (footnotes omitted); see Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 78-79(1974).
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In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,70 although the Court was
"mindful that the language of a statute controls when [it is] sufficiently clear
in its context"17 1 and that "further inquiry [might] be unnecessary,17 2 it turned
"necessary.

"nevertheless, to the legislative history of the . . . Act to ascertain whether

3
there [was] support for the meaning attributed to [the statute].""7
In the recent
case of Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc.,7 4 the Court
asserted even stronger support for the importance of legislative history, since
it found that, to the extent that the lower court excluded Sreference to the
legislative history of the act in question, it was in error.7
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the Ninth Circuit erred in
adhering so vigorously to its literal interpretation of the interim limits section.
As the District of Columbia Circuit recognized, it is clearly appropriate, and
arguably necessary, to examine the legislative history of the Act to ascertain
whether Congress intended section 3161(h) delay to be excluded in computing
section 3164's ninety-day limit.

B. The Legislative History
The legislative history of the Act supports the District of Columbia Circuit's
finding that Congress intended section 316 1(h)'s excludable delay provisions to
be applied in computing section 3164's ninety-day interim limit. The Senate
report, in referring to the newly added section 3164, states: "There was
consensus among the witnesses that although immediate implementation of
69. It is noteworthy that in no case since American Trucking, with the possible exception of
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), has the Supreme Court actually refused to
look at legislative history. Murphy, supra note 65, at 1303.
70. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
71. Id. at 201.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 426 U.S. 1 (1976). This was a citizen suit brought under the provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975), (amending 33 U.S.C. §§
1151-1175 (1970)), against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its Administrator to
compel the Administrator to perform an alleged nondiscretionary duty to regulate the discharge of
radioactive materials into navigable waters. The issue was whether the term "pollutants" as used in
the FWPCA included radioactive materials subject to regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
The Tenth Circuit relied upon the rule of statutory construction that "in construing a statute the
court should first look to the language of the statute itself," and that, if the language is clear, there is
no need to resort to other rules of construction. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v.
Train, 507 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 426 U.S. 1(1976). The court concluded that, since
the statute was plain and unambiguous, it need not concern itself with legislative history and with
"the ofttimes difficult task of ascertaining legislative intent through legislative history." Id. at
748. The Supreme Court reversed, reasserting its position in American Trucking that "Iwlhen aid
to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can
be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial
examination.'" 426 U.S. at 10 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S.
534, 543-44 (1940)).
75. 426 U.S. at 9-10.
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60-day trials was impractical, it was important and would be feasible to
provide for speedy trials for detained defendants. This change is based in part
upon a similar provision adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit."'76 This passage indicates that Congress's purpose in
adding section 3164 was to alleviate, immediately upon passage of the Act,
the problem of delay in trials of detained defendants and not to provide them
with speedier trials than all defendants would receive under the permanent
provisions of the Act. A look at the Second Circuit Rules, on which section
3164 was based, supports this interpretation, since the rules clearly provided
for the exclusion of delay in computing the time between confinement and
trial for detained defendants. Rule 5 provided that in computing time limits
under rules 3 and 4,77 certain periods of delay similar to those in section
3161(h) should be excluded. 78 Rule 3, strikingly similar to section 3164,
provided that, in cases involving a detained defendant, the government must
be ready for trial within ninety days from the date of detention. 79 If the
government was not ready, and if the defendant was charged with only a noncapital offense, the defendant was to be released. 80
Additional evidence of congressional intent that periods of delay not be
included in computing the ninety-day interim limit may be found in the Senate
Committee's discussion of delay caused by court congestion." The Committee
noted that the Second Circuit's rule 3 made the sanction of dismissal applicable only where the prosecutor was not ready for trial within ninety days, but
that the sanction would not be applied if the trial could not take place on time
because of court delay. 8 2 The Committee asserted that, in this respect, the Act
would differ from the Second Circuit rule since the sanction of dismissal
76. S. Rep., supra note 3, at S. The Senate report, in discussing the history of speedy trial
provisions leading up to passage of the Act, notes: "On January 5, 1971, the Judicial Council for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit announced its intention to place into operation
six months hence a set of rules requiring the prompt disposition of criminal cases. In essence, the rules
require the Government to be ready for trial within six months of arrest if the defendant is not
detained, and within 90 days if he is detained. The rules also allow a number of the traditional
exclusions (i.e. for certain pretrial proceedings), suggested by the American Bar Association Standards, and contained in many of the modern speedy trial statutes. The rules also contain a mandatory
dismissal sanction if the United States Attorney is not ready for trial within the prescribed time
limits." Id. at 17; see note 52 supra.
77. The provisions of rule 4 were similar to those of § 3161 of the Act. The rule, which set up
general speedy trial guidelines, provided: "In all cases the government must be ready for trial
within six months from the date of the arrest, service of summons, detention, or the filing of a
complaint or of a formal charge ....
If the government is not ready for trial within such time, or
within the periods as extended by the district court for good cause under rule 5, and if the
defendant is charged only with non-capital offenses, then, upon application of the defendant or
upon motion of the district court ... the charge shall be dismissed." 2d Circuit Rules, supra note
52, rule 4.
78. Id. rule 5.
79. Id. rule 3.
80. Id.
81. S. Rep., supra note 3, at 22.
82. Id.
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would be applicable to both the prosecutor and the court.8 3 It is noteworthy
that the Committee did not state that section 3164 would differ from the
Second Circuit rule with respect to the applicability of delay in computing the
time to trial.
C.

The Effect of Judicial Council Approval
of District Court Speedy Trial Plans
Totally apart from the issues of statutory construction and congressional
purpose is the question of the effect of judicial council8 4 approval of district
court speedy trial plans. Section 3165(a) of the Act provides that each district
court "shall prepare plans for the disposition of criminal cases in accordance
with [the Act]," 8 5 and section 3165(c) requires that each district court plan be
approved by the judicial council of the circuit.8 6 The question which arises is
whether approval by the judicial council is a judicial determination in the
circuit of the interpretation to be given to the Act, or whether it is a mere
stamp of administrative approval. If council approval is judicial in nature,
the courts in the circuit may be barred from holding that an approved plan
incorrectly interprets the Act. In that case, one can merely look at the plans
approved in the circuit to determine that circuit's interpretation of section
3164. In contrast, if council approval is administrative in nature, the courts
are free, in judicial settings, to interpret the provisions of the Act and to hold
that any approved plan fails to conform to their interpretation of section 3164.
Although the effect of judicial council approval of district court plans has
not been raised in the cases, the Supreme Court has considered the dual role
of the council members as judges and as administrators. Chandler v. Judicial
Council8 7 raised the issue of whether an order issued by the Judicial Council
of the Tenth Circuit, finding that a district judge in the Circuit was unable or
unwilling to discharge his duties and directing that no further cases be
assigned to him, was an order reviewable by the Supreme Court. The judge
83. Id.
84. The judicial councils of the circuits are composed of the active circuit judges of each
circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970). They are charged with making "all necessary orders for the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within [their] drcuitqsl." Id.
§ 332(d). This grant of power includes assigning judges to districts and to particular types of
cases, ordering judges to decide cases which have long been held under advisement, and setting
standards of judicial ethics. Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial
Administration, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 207 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fish]. In addition, the
councils have been given responsibility for approving district court plans under the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. §3006A (1970 & Supp. V 1975), the Jury Selection and Service Act
of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and, now, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. V 1975)). Fish, supra at 216.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3165(a) (Supp. V 1975).
86. Id. § 3165(c). Section 3165(c) requires that each district plan "shall be submitted for
approval to a reviewing panel consisting of the members of the judicial council of the circuit and
either the chief judge of the district court whose plan is being reviewed or such other active judge
of that court as the chief judge . . . may designate." Id.
87. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
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involved asked the Court to issue an order under the All Writs Act"8 instructing the Council "to 'cease acting [in] violation of [his] rights as a federal judge
and an American citizen.' "89 The Judicial Council contended that its action
was solely administrative and that it could not, therefore, be reviewed as an
original proceeding by the Supreme Court. Although the Court did not decide
the nature of the Judicial Council's action, 90 it discussed the issue at length in
the majority opinion, a concurring opinion of Justice Harlan and a dissent of
Justice Douglas.
The Solicitor General had filed a brief as amicus curiae contending that the
Court had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for writ of mandamus or
prohibition when a judicial council order was directed to a district judge
because, in such circumstances, the council acted as a judicial, rather than an
administrative, tribunal. He took the position that the council was "nothing
more nor less than the Court of Appeals sitting en bane"9 1 and that the
proceeding could be analogized to a disbarment. The Court noted, however,
that there was nothing in the statute or legislative history which indicated that
Congress intended the councils to be courts of appeal en bane 92 or which
suggested that they were "to be anything other than an administrative body
functioning in a very limited area in a narrow sense as a 'board of directors'
for the circuit." 93 Congress had given each council authority to make "all
necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts within [its] circuit." 94 The Court stated that matters
involving solely the internal operation of the courts, such as the length of time
a case may be delayed in decision and whether a case is to be tried, were
administrative. 95 It was, therefore, within the power of the councils to make
reasonable, proper, and necessary rules concerning such matters. In Chandler, although it was not necessary to decide the issue, the Court noted that
the Judicial Council's action, in directing that no further cases be assigned 96to
the judge, had much of what the Court thought of as administrative action.
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, did not agree that the action
taken by the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit was administrative. He
stated that "[t]his legislative history lends support to a conclusion that, at least
in the issuance of orders to district judges to regulate the exercise of their
official duties, the Judicial Council acts as a judicial tribunal for purposes of
88. Id. at 76 n.2 ("The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.') (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970)).
89. Id. at 76-77.
90. The Court held that the judge was not entitled to the remedy sought because he had
expressly acquiesced in the division of business in the district and because he had not sought other
relief which might be open to him from the Council or other tribunal. Id. at 88-89.
91. Id. at 83.
92. Id. at 83 n.5.
93. Id. at 86 n.7.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 84-85.
96. Id. at 88 n.10.
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this Court's appellate jurisdiction under Article lI. '97 He found that the
discretion exercised by the councils in taking actions necessary to expedite
business in the circuit was not of a different kind from that exercised by
district judges in many matters of trial administration. 98 Justice Douglas, in
his dissent, also believed that, although some functions performed by the
councils may be administrative, an order directed against a district judge
disqualifying him from sitting moved against him "with all of the sting and
much of the stigma that impeachment carries." 99 Under such circumstances,
the Council acted as an "inferior judicial tribunal,'"10 0 raising a case or
controversy over which the Court had appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, while the nature of judicial council action is not always clear, it is
apparent that in at least some cases the councils act purely as administrative
bodies. In the case of judicial council approval of district court speedy trial
plans, the action looks more administrative than judicial. The speedy trial
plans relate directly to the "effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts"'' 1 and may be analogized to other internal rules
governing the business of the courts. As such, they seem to be precisely what
the Supreme Court thought of as administrative in Chandler. Furthermore, in
merely approving district court plans, the judicial councils do not move in any
way, against any person, with the "sting" of judicial action.
An inference may be made that at least some of the councils consider their
action in approving district court plans administrative. Six of the eleven
circuit councils' 02 have approved both district plans which incorporate section
3161(h) exclusions into computation of time limits under section 3164 and
district plans which provide that section 3161(h) exclusions are inapplicable to
computations of section 3164 time limits.' 0 3 If such approval is judicial in
nature, the concept of stare decisis is suffering.
As a practical matter, most judges believe that their action in reviewing
97. Id. at 102 (Harlan, J., concurring). Article III of the United States Constitution provides
that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in "Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party," but that "[iln
all the
other Cases... the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction .... U.S. ConsL art. in, §
2, cl.2.
98. 398 U.S. at 108-09 (Harlan, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 135 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970); see note 84 supra.
102. Appellants Memorandum of Law and Fact at appendices B & C, United States v.
Corley, 548 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The six circuits are the first, third, fourth, fifth, seventh,
and eighth. Id.
103. Telephone interview with Mr. Norbert A. Halloran, Speedy Trial Coordinator in the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Sept. 7, 1977). This is consistent with the
authority granted to the councils in their approval of plans under the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); see note 84 supm. The Juy Act limits
review to the issue of the district court plan's compliance with the provisions of the Act, and It is
not intended that the panel substitute its own plan for district court plans in compliance with
the statute. Fish, supra note 84, at 216 n.113.
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district court plans is tacit approval, 104 and that they are not, therefore,
judicially binding themselves. This view is consistent with the majority view
in Chandler and with the legislative purpose of "giv[ing] judges a statutory
framework and power whereby they might 'put their own house in order.' ",05
If judicial council approval of district court speedy trial plans is, in fact,
administrative in nature, the courts in the circuit are not bound by approved
plans in their interpretation of the interim limits section. The courts may, 0of6
course, use approved plans as some guidance in their interpretative task,
but their primary source of aid in construing the statute should be the
legislative history of the Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

The legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act should not be ignored in
construing the interim limits section, no matter how "plain" the wording of
the statute may appear. That history argues persuasively that Congress
intended that periods of delay not be considered in computing the ninety-day
interim limit applicable to detained and high-risk defendants. This interpretation is reasonable, particularly in view of the danger of released felons
fleeing from the jurisdiction of the courts. It is to be hoped that, in construing
the interim limits section of the Act, the remaining circuits will adopt the
reasonable statutory construction of the District of Columbia Circuit and will
reject the Ninth Circuit's plain meaning approach.
Greta Glavis Keenoy
104. 398 U.S. at 85.
105. Id.
106. Twenty-six of the district court plans recommend amending the Act to make the
excludable time limits expressly applicable to the interim time limits. A bill to this effect, H.R.
14521, has been introduced in the Congress, Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Report on the Implementation of Title I and Title II of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 at 20 (Sept.
30, 1976.)

